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Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an endur-
ing evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solu-
tions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions 
attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little  
attention is given to the fact that novel defection 
strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially 
in the presence of punishment to the defectors and 
public knowledge of strategies employed by the play-
ers, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished 
by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can 
get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. 
Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from 
such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish 
other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such 
discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in 
the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s  
Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a 
costly act. These refined defection strategies destabi-
lize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, 
however, unstable in the population. Discriminating 
defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the 
presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them 
and defecting with others. However, since these play-
ers also defect with other discriminators they suffer 
fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punish-
ers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast 
to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect 
with other punishing defectors but also punish them 
and get punished. As a consequence of both these sce-
narios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the 
population. We thus show ironically that refined  
defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Further-
more, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can 
work under a wide range of initial conditions and is 
robust to mistakes.  
 
Keywords: Discrimination, evolution of cooperation, 
evolutionary game theory, punishment, reputation. 
 
IN Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), despite the fact that mutual 
cooperation always yields more benefits than mutual  
defection, personal interests forbid the evolution of co-
operation. A number of possible mechanisms which have 
been claimed to bolster cooperation, include kin selec-
tion1, direct2,3 and indirect4,5 reciprocity. These mechanisms 
fail to account for cooperation in humans throughout the 
range of realistic conditions. Humans are known to co-
operate with genetically unrelated individuals, with peo-
ple they will never meet again and when reputation gains 
are negligible6,7. Recent ethnographic8,9, empirical6 and 
theoretical10–16 studies advocate the idea that cooperation 
can evolve if cooperating individuals have an inclination  
towards punishing the defectors. This suggestion, how-
ever, displaces rather than resolves the puzzle17. Since 
non-punishing cooperators can free-ride on punishers’ 
contribution to punishment, punishment itself is destabi-
lized. The second-order free riders can invade punishing 
cooperators and in the absence of punishment, coopera-
tion cannot be stable. Mechanisms including conform-
ism16, meta-punishment18, meta-reward19, signalling20, 
reputation damage21,22, group selection12,15 and voluntary 
participation23–25 have been suggested as possible solu-
tions to the second-order free-rider problem. However, 
they work only under specific conditions.  
 The focus so far has been on sophistication of coopera-
tive and punishing strategies, while little consideration 
has been given to the possibility that greater sophistica-
tion in the defection strategies will also evolve. We show 
here that sophistication in defection ironically stabilizes 
punishment and cooperation in turn. 
 If public knowledge of strategies is possible, then pun-
ishers can build a reputation for punishing. This can  
enable the defectors to discriminate between punishing 
and non-punishing individuals. We propose that if such 
discriminating defectors defect with both non-punishing 
cooperators and other defectors, but cooperate with pun-
ishers to avoid punishment, then such defectors will have 
a selective benefit over unconditional defectors. Further-
more, if discriminating defectors cooperate to avoid punish-
ment, then a defector strategy that punishes other 
defectors can exploit more cooperation by threatening the 
discriminating individuals.  We show that such discrimi-
nating and punishing defectors will evolve under natural 
selection and in turn destabilize unconditional defection. 
However, these defectors confront severe fitness loss in 
pure populations as they keep defecting with similar 
strategists or punish and get punished from similar strate-
gists, or both. Nonetheless, these strategies give selective 
benefit to the punishing cooperators and thus stabilize 
punishment and in turn cooperation in the population.  
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 Our synthesis buds from earlier work on the evolution 
of cooperation in the presence of punishment2,18,26. Tri-
vers2, while discussing the evolution of cooperation 
through reciprocal altruism, anticipated that punishment 
(what he called as moralistic aggression) will evolve to 
protect against defection, which in turn would lead to the 
evolution of discriminating strategies. In a repeated 
game, Boyd and Richerson18 considered a strategy called 
‘reluctant cooperators’ who defect in all round before get-
ting punished and after getting punished continue cooper-
ating forever. A more direct reference to strategy similar 
to discriminating defectors comes in Sigmund et al.26 
who, in a mini-public goods game, have considered, 
among other behavioural options, a small probability that 
defectors cooperate with punishers. They, however, failed 
to consider discriminating defector as a distinct behav-
ioural strategy and they do not discuss the contribution of 
this strategy in the evolution of punishment in an exten-
sive manner. The concept of defecting punishers (also 
called selfish punishers) has been advocated as a strategy 
that maintains polymorphic equilibrium, where both  
cooperators and defecting punishers coexist27–29. We, 
however, argue that only defecting punishers do not re-
solve the problem of cooperation, but discriminating and 
punishing defectors together can destabilize defective 
equilibrium of PD and pave the way for the evolution of 
punishment and cooperation in the system. 
 In this article, we consider two refinements in defection 
strategies: (1) discriminating ability and (2) punishing 
ability. We build our model in two stages. In the first 
stage we have considered a model in which only coopera-
tors can punish and the strategies are deterministic, i.e. a 
player can either be an unconditional cooperator, punish-
ing cooperator, unconditional defector or discriminating 
defector. We show that punishing cooperators are stable 
in the presence of discriminating defectors and the results 
are robust to errors in discrimination. In the second stage 
we relax our assumption that only cooperators can punish 
and that players use only one discrete strategy, by build-
ing a stochastic strategy game. We show that punishment 
evolves in the presence of discriminating defectors even 
in the stochastic strategy game. We further show that it is 
possible to evolve stable cooperation with refined defec-
tion strategies and without classical cooperators. 
Public knowledge and the evolution of  
discriminating defectors 
Model 
In a two-person PD game both players have two beha-
vioural options, either to cooperate or to defect. Let b be 
the benefit of a cooperative act and c be the cost of co-
operation, such that b > c > 0. In a PD interaction the 
benefit of a cooperative act is only to the opponent, while 
the cooperator pays the cost of cooperation. Thus, if both 
the players cooperate mutually, then both achieve the 
payoff b–c; while if both defect, both get nothing. If one 
player cooperates while the other defects, then the co-
operator gets –c and the defector gets b. As defection  
always pays better, irrespective of the behavioural choice 
of the opponent, defection is the only Nash Equilibrium 
(NE) in this game.  
 We considered an extended PD game with four beha-
vioural options for each player (Table 1). Cooperators (C) 
unconditionally cooperate with all other strategies with-
out punishing a defector. A defector (D) unconditionally 
defects with all other strategies. Punishing cooperators 
(PC) cooperate with all other strategies, but punish a  
defector with a penalty y to the defector and at a cost x to 
itself (y > x > 0). If we consider a scenario where public 
knowledge of strategies is known, then punishers can 
build a reputation for punishing a defector. In such condi-
tions, discriminating defector (DD) can discriminate  
between players and can selectively cooperate with a 
punisher to avoid punishment. A player adopting DD 
strategy pays cost d for discrimination. We have assumed 
that d < c, so that players will prefer to discriminate and 
defect rather than cooperate with a cooperator. It would 
be also logical to assume that y > c + d, so that players 
prefer to cooperate with a punisher rather than defect and 
get punished. 
 If p, q, r and s are the frequencies of players adopting 
strategies C, D, PC and DD respectively, such that p + q + 
r + s = 1, then based on the payoff matrix (Table 1), the 
payoffs of individuals adopting different strategies can be 
given as: 
 
 C ( ) ,E p r b c= + −  (1) 
 
 D ( ) ,E p r b ry= + −  (2) 
 
 PC ( ) ,E p r s b qx c= + + − −  (3) 
 
 DD ( ) ,E p r b rc d= + − −  (4) 
 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
 C D PC DD 
 
C b–c –c b–c –c 
D b 0 b–y 0 
PC b–c –c–x b–c b–c 
DD b–d –d b–c–d –d 
Each player can adopt one of the four different strategies – cooperator 
(C), defector (D), punishing cooperator (PC) and discriminating defec-
tor (DD). Payoffs of only the row players are given in the matrix, 
where b is the benefit of a cooperative act, c the cost of cooperation, x 
the cost of punishment, y the penalty paid by the defector who is pun-
ished and d is the cost of discrimination between players adopting dif-
ferent strategies (d < c and y > c + d). 
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where EI indicates average payoff of an individual adopt-
ing strategy I. The frequency of the players using the 
given strategy changes according to the replicator equa-
tion30,31, 
 ( ).i i ix x f f= −?  (5) 
The replicator equation describes deterministic but fre-
quency-dependent selection dynamics. The fitness, fi, of 
type i is a function of the frequencies of all strategies 
(phenotypes) 1 2( , ,..., ).nx x x x=?  For pairwise interactions, 
we can consider linear fitness functions, ,i j j ijf x a= Σ  
where the aij values denote the payoff matrix of the game 
(i.e. payoff of an individual using strategy i when in con-
test with an individual using strategy j). The average 
payoff of the population is given by i i if x f= Σ . The  
replicator dynamics ensures that even if the population 
starts from any initial frequency of players adopting  
different strategies, it will eventually change and will 
converge to NE. Once the population converges to NE, it 
will stay there forever31. We will indicate the payoff of 
strategy I when in contest with a strategy J as E[I|J].  
 In our model, players interact in pairs and the same two 
players need not meet again (or in other words, need not 
keep a memory of previous interactions). Thus, the indi-
viduals are concerned only with their current gains. We 
have assumed that the discriminators can keep track of 
the strategies of other players by eavesdropping, gossip-
ing or through a network of communication. Irrespective 
of the mode of information gathering, we always assume 
that discrimination incurs some cost to the discriminator. 
Analysis  
In the absence of PC and DD, D is the only NE in the 
game and even though initially rare, D can invade a popu-
lation of C and get stabilized.  However, if we add PC 
players to the population of C and D, then the dynamics 
of the game changes drastically. There is a mixed strategy 
NE at r* = (c + x)/(y + x), where if p = 0 and q* = (y – c)/ 
(y + x), then such a population is bistable. That is if 
r > r*, then cooperation gets apparently stable, while if 
r < r*, D invades the system and becomes stable (Figure 
1). However, r* is a weak equilibrium. Even when r > r*, 
it cannot be assured that cooperation will be stable, be-
cause if there is even a single defector in the system then 
PC players will pay some cost of punishing, while C will 
not and so selection will favour C over PC players. Also, 
when selection is neutral for C and PC, natural drift can 
bring down the frequency of PC below r*. If this hap-
pens, defectors can invade the population and become 
stable. Similar arguments are advocated for strategies  
regarding indirect reciprocity5 and for punishment in  
‘n-person’ situations11. 
 If we add DD players to the heterogeneous population 
containing C, D and PC, then PC can become stabilized 
(Figure 2). We have studied the dynamics of PC in the 
presence of DD in two different scenarios. In the first 
scenario, the cost of discrimination is assumed negligibly 
small. In this game, DD players will replace D players in 
the population. This is because DD players do not get 
punished as they cooperate with a PC player. In a popula-
tion comprising of PC, C and DD, PC is the only NE pre-
dicted by the replicator dynamics (Figure 3 a). Success of 
PC in the presence of DD is due to the selective benefit 
that it gets over a C player, as E[PC|DD] > E[C|DD]. Fur-
thermore, a PC player gets cooperation from PC, C as 
well as DD players and a PC player does not have to pay 
the cost of punishment as no strategy defects with it. In a 
population of C players, when DD and PC are rare, DD 
players invade C players as E[DD|C] > E[C|C]. Nonethe-
less, DD players cannot sustain their population against 
PC players as E[PC|DD] > E[DD|DD]. The heterogeneous 
population of C, PC and DD, therefore, has a unique NE 
at PC. 
 In the second scenario, the cost of discrimination is 
considered significant.  In this game both DD and D 
players will coexist. Thus, we will consider a population 
containing only PC, D and DD strategy as in the presence 
of two defecting strategies, D and DD; C anyway gets 
eliminated in the initial few rounds of the iterated PD 
(Figure 2). In a population comprising only PC, D and 
DD players, PC can become stable over a wide set of ini-
tial frequencies (Figure 3 b), or in other words, has a bigger 
basin of attraction. The success of PC lies in the selective 
benefit to the PC players over D players in the presence 
of DD players as E[PC|DD] > E(D, DD) and in the ability 
of PC players to invade the population of DD players. 
The point r* = (c + x)/(y + x) on the PC and D edge of the  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ternary plot of change in frequency of players using PC, C 
and D strategies. Filled circles are stable Nash Equilibria (NEs), while 
unfilled circles are unstable NEs. Arrows indicate direction of changing 
frequencies of individuals using a particular strategy, from their initial 
frequencies. The point q* is the threshold frequency of D above which 
D will be stable. Cooperation evolves in the grey area. Parameters used 
here are: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1 and y = 0.8. 
RESEARCH ARTICLES 
 
CURRENT SCIENCE, VOL. 96, NO. 6, 25 MARCH 2009 804 
 
 
Figure 2. Change in frequency and average payoffs of non-punishing cooperators (C), defectors (D), punishing coopera-
tors (PC) and discriminating defectors (DD), for different initial frequencies of the strategies. (a) p = 0.25, q = 0.25, 
r = 0.25, s = 0.25. (b) p = 0.77, q = 0.10, r = 0.05, s = 0.08. (c) p = 0.04, q = 0.60, r = 0.15, s = 0.21. (d) p = 0.1, q = 0.1, 
r = 0.1, s = 0.7. Parameters used here are: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1, y = 0.8 and d = 0.05. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Evolutionary dynamics between C, D, PC and DD players when the cost of discrimination is 
negligibly small (d = 0.001) (a)  and is substantial (d = 0.05) (b). The point r* is the threshold frequency 
of PC above which PC or alternatively cooperation will be stable. Cooperation evolves in the grey area. 
Filled circles are stable NEs, while empty circles are unstable NEs. Arrows indicate direction of changing 
frequencies of individuals using a particular strategy, from their initial frequencies. Other parameters 
used here are: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1 and y = 0.8. 
 
 
simplex given in Figure 3 b is an unstable equilibrium 
and PC players are fixed in the population only if r > r*. 
Mistakes in discrimination 
Discrimination by DD players is prone to mistakes. DD 
players can defect with PC players by mistake, either by 
error in discrimination or because of insufficient knowl-
edge about the strategy of the opponent. It is logical to 
think that in the case of uncertainty, DD players will always 
defect with the opponent, as defection is the only NE in 
the PD. If μ is the probability that a DD player defects 
even with a PC player, then the payoff of PC and DD 
players will be as follows: 
 
 PC [ (1 )] [ ( )] ,E p r s b q s x cμ μ= + + − − + −  (6) 
 DD ( ) (1 ) .E p r b r c r y dμ μ= + − − − −  (7) 
 
Note that the payoffs of C and D players (eqs (1) and (2)) 
will remain unaltered.  
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 In a heterogeneous population consisting of C, D, PC 
and DD strategies, punishment becomes stable even when 
the error in discrimination approaches 60%. The tolerance 
to mistakes, however, is influenced by the initial frequen-
cies of the strategies and the cost of discrimination (d). 
There is a general tendency towards increase in tolerance 
to mistakes as the frequency of C and D is less, while fre-
quency of PC and DD is more. This is because of the  
instability of PC, in the presence of C and D, when DD is 
either rare or absent. 
 Also, tolerance to mistakes in discrimination increases 
as the cost of discrimination decreases. The reason for 
this trend can be attributed to the fact that PC gets a  
selective benefit over C and D only in the presence of  
DD players, as E[PC|DD] > E[C|DD] and E[PC|DD] > 
E[D|DD]. So establishment of DD players in the popula-
tion is an obligatory first step for the success of PC. 
Thus, as the cost of discrimination d gets smaller, DD 
players can establish their population rapidly. The decrease 
in tolerance to mistakes with increase in d is nonlinear 
and is best described by a polynomial function (Figure 4).  
 There is always a threshold level of tolerance to errors 
above which punishment, and in turn cooperation, is  
unstable in the system. This threshold behaviour can  
be attributed to the following fact. PC players are always 
evolutionary stable against DD players because E[PC|PC] > 
E[DD|PC] for any c < y. However, PC players can  
invade the population of DD players only if E[PC|DD] > 
E[DD|DD], which is fulfilled when μ < (b – c + d)/(b + x). 
Thus, for sufficiently small errors, PC players can invade 
the population of DD players and become stable. How-
ever, if the last condition is reversed then both PC and 
DD are bistable, with an unstable mixed strategy NE, 
where both types of players coexist. If the errors are high  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Maximum mistakes (μ) tolerated for different values of cost 
of discrimination (d) when a DD player defects with a PC player by 
mistake. The initial frequencies of all the strategies were considered 
equal. Other parameters were: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1 and y = 0.8. 
and DD players are common in the population, PC play-
ers cannot establish their population. However, because 
DD players have to pay the cost of discrimination, their 
population is vulnerable to invasion by D players. As a 
result, above the threshold level of errors, the population 
yields to defection.  
 We will look at the change in the dynamics of the 
game with increase in mistakes for two scenarios, as we 
did before. In the first scenario, the cost of discrimination 
is assumed negligible so that in a population DD will  
replace D players. Thus, we will consider only three 
types of players, C, PC and DD. In this game cooperation 
is still stable when there are 60% mistakes (Figure 5). 
Nonetheless, PC is not the only NE and as the mistakes 
increase both PC and C will be stable. The reason for the 
shift in NE from pure PC to a mixture of PC and C is  
because of the following reason. When some of the DD 
players defect with PC players by mistake, PC will pay 
the cost of punishment. This will give C players a selec-
tive benefit over PC players, as they do not punish. 
 In the second scenario we will consider the cost of dis-
crimination to be significant, so both D and DD players 
will coexist. However, we can eliminate C players from 
this population, as they anyway get extinct in the initial 
few rounds of the game in the presence of two defecting 
strategies. The dynamics of the game with D, PC and DD 
strategies in the presence of mistakes depicts that as the 
mistakes increase, the domain in which punishment and 
in turn cooperation is stable decreases (Figure 6). How-
ever, this decrease is slow with increase in mistakes and 
the basin of attraction for PC is still bigger than for D 
players. 
 In the above analysis we assumed two conditions: (1) 
DD players have to pay a cost of discrimination even 
though they fail to discriminate sometimes, and (2) DD 
players only make mistakes by defecting with a PC player 
and never by cooperating with other players. We will  
relax these assumptions below. We can relax the first as-
sumption by replacing d with d(1 – μ) in eq. (7). The sec-
ond assumption can be rectified by considering that with 
the same error rate (μ), a DD player cooperates with C, D 
and other DD players. The resultant dynamics is qualita-
tively similar to that discussed above. However, tolerance 
to mistakes is significantly lesser in this case (Figure 7). 
If the cost of discrimination is small, the tolerance to mis-
takes can be up to 30%. Under the modified conditions, 
PC players will be evolutionary stable against invasion by 
DD players if y > c + d, the basic condition of the model, 
which is essential for the evolution of the discriminators. 
Furthermore, PC players will invade the population of 
DD players if μ < (b – c + d)/(2d – c + x + d).  If μ is 
large, PC players are unable to invade DD players and 
owing to the cost of discrimination, they would yield to D 
players. This demonstrates that both defection and dis-
crimination need to achieve perfection for the stability of 
cooperation. 
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Figure 5. Ternary plot of change in the frequency of players using PC, C and DD strategies, when the cost of discrimi-
nation (d) is negligibly small, for different probabilities of mistakes (μ). (a) μ = 0.01, (b) μ = 0.1, (c) μ = 0.4 and (d) 
μ = 0.6. Filled circles are stable NEs. Arrows indicate direction of changing frequencies of individuals using a particular 
strategy, from their initial frequencies. The dynamics depicts that PC is the only NE when mistakes are rare, while as mis-
takes increase, both PC and C are stable. Parameters used here are: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1, y = 0.8 and d = 0.001. 
 
 
Discriminating and punishing defectors 
So far, we have considered that players use discrete strate-
gies like complete cooperation, discrimination or punish-
ment with certainty. Furthermore, we also considered that 
only cooperators punish the defectors and norm violators. 
There is no a priori reason why only cooperators should 
punish. We will relax both these assumptions by con-
structing stochastic models. 
 Consider each player as having a strategy given by a 
pair of probabilities (t, w) ∈ [0, 1]2, where t is the pro-
bability that the player cooperates (so the player defects 
with probability 1 – t) and w is the probability that the 
player punishes a defector. We can plot all the possible 
combinations of strategies in a unit square with vertices 
(0, 0) for defectors who never punish, (0, 1) for defector 
who punishes, (1, 0) for cooperators who do not punish 
and (1, 1) for cooperators who punishes. These four ver-
tices are the pure strategies of the game, while all other 
points in the interior of the unit square and on the borders 
are mixed strategies. If the population is using a strategy 
(t0, w0), then the payoff of a player adopting a different 
strategy (t1, w1) can be given as: 
 
 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0
[( , ) | ( , )] ( ) (1 )
(1 )( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( ).
E t w t w t t b c t t b
t t c w t y w t x
= − + −
+ − − + − − + − −  (8) 
 
Keeping one probability in a strategy the same as the 
population, we can derive differential equations that gov-
ern the dynamics of the other probability. Thus, the dif-
ferential equations that depict the change in t and w can 
be given as: 
 
 ,t c wy= − +?  (9) 
 
 .w x tx= − +?  (10) 
 
A vector field plot of eqs (9) and (10) is shown in Figure 
8 a. If w < c/y, then the derivative of t (eq. (9)) is negative 
and so t decreases; when t is less than 1, the derivative of 
w (eq. (10)) is also negative and so the strategy (0, 0) is a 
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Figure 6. Ternary plot of change in frequency of the players using PC, D and DD strategies, when the cost of 
discrimination (d) is significant, for different probabilities of mistakes (μ). (a) μ = 0.01, (b) μ = 0.1, (c) μ = 0.4 
and (d) μ = 0.6. Filled circles are stable NEs, while unfilled circles are unstable NEs. Arrows indicate direction of 
changing frequencies of individuals using a particular strategy, from their initial frequencies. Parameters used 
here are: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1, y = 0.8 and d = 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Maximum mistakes (μ) tolerated for different values of cost 
of discrimination (d). The initial frequencies of all the strategies were 
considered equal. Other parameters were: b = 1, c = 0.3, x = 0.1 and 
y = 0.8. 
 
stable NE of the game. If w > c/y, then the edge defined 
by the points (1, c/y) and (1, 1) is stable; however, this 
stability is weak. This is because in the absence of defec-
tors natural drifts can decrease the punishing frequency 
less than c/y and under these conditions (0, 0) will be the 
only stable strategy. This argument is similar to that raised 
in Figure 1, except for the fact that we have considered 
both cooperators and defectors as being able to punish 
norm violators.  
 We will now consider two scenarios similar to what we 
considered for the deterministic model. In the first sce-
nario, the cost of discrimination is negligibly small and 
so all the defectors exist as discriminating defectors, 
while in the second scenario the cost of discrimination is 
significant and so both unconditional defectors and dis-
criminating defectors coexist. 
 For the first scenario, let us consider each player to 
have a strategy given by a pair of probabilities (u, w) ∈ 
[0, 1]2, where u is the probability that the player cooper-
ates, (1 – u) the probability that the player discriminates 
between individuals and cooperates only with punishers 
and w the probability that the player punishes a defector. 
The pure strategies at the vertices will be (0, 0) for discri-
minating defectors who never punish, (0, 1) for discrimi-
nating defectors who punish, (1, 0) for cooperators who 
do not punish, and (1, 1) for cooperators who punish. All 
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other points in the interior of the unit square and on the 
borders are mixed strategies. If the population is using a 
strategy (u0, w0), then the payoff of a player adopting a 
different strategy (u1, w1) can be given as: 
 
 
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 1
[( , ) | ( , )] ( ) (1 )[ ( )
(1 )( )] (1 ) [ ( )
(1 ) ] (1 )(1 )
[ ( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ] (1 )( ).
E u w u w u u b c u u w b c
w c u u w b c
w b u u
w w b c w w c
w w b u d
= − + − −
+ − − + − −
+ − + − −
× − + − −
+ − + − −
 
 (11) 
 
The derivates which describe the change in the probabili-
ties u and w can be given as: 
 
 ,u c wc d= − + +?  (12) 
 .w b ub= −?  (13) 
 
A vector field plot of eqs (12) and (13) is shown in Fig-
ure 8 b. The edge described by the points (1, 1 – d/c) and 
(1, 1) is an evolutionary stable NE of the game and is a 
global attractor. When d → 0, there is only one point (1, 1), 
which is evolutionary stable. In any case, discriminating 
defectors stabilize punishment in the system. 
 In the second scenario, let us consider that each player 
has a strategy given by a pair of probabilities (v, w) ∈ 
[0, 1]2, where v is the probability that the player is a dis-
criminating defector (1 – v) the probability that the player 
is a unconditional defector and w the probability that the 
player punishes a defector. The pure strategies at the ver-
tices will be (0, 0) for defectors who never punish, (0, 1) 
for defectors who punish, (1, 0) for discriminating defec-
tors who do not punish, and (1, 1) for discriminating de-
fectors who punish. All other points in the interior of the 
unit square and on the borders are mixed strategies. If the 
population is using a strategy (v0, w0), then the payoff of 
a player adopting a different strategy (v1, w1) can be 
given as: 
 
 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1
[( , ) | ( , )] (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
[ ( ) (1 )
(1 ) ( )] ( ).
E v w v w v w y v w x
v v w b v v w c
v v w w b c w w b
w w c v d
= − − + − −
+ − + − −
+ − + −
+ − − + −
 
 (14) 
The derivates which describe the change in the probabili-
ties v and w can be given as, 
 
 ,v wy wc d= − −?  (15) 
 .w x vx vb= − + +?  (16) 
 
A vector field plot of eqs (15) and (16) is shown in Fig-
ure 8 c. There are two evolutionary stable NEs at (1, 1) 
and (0, 0) and two unstable NEs at (0, d/(y – c)) and 
((x/(b + x)), 0). If punishment frequency is less then d/(y – c) 
and discrimination frequency is less then x/(b + x), then 
defection without punishment (0, 0) is the only stable 
strategy. However, as cost of discrimination (d) decreases 
and cost of cooperation (x) decreases, and the area in 
which defection is stable and punishment does not evolve 
becomes negligibly small. Thus, the equilibrium (1, 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Vector field plots of stochastic strategy game. Plot of eqs 
(9) and (10) (a), eqs (12) and (13) (b) and eqs (15) and (16) (c). For 
further details see text. Unfilled bars and circles are unstable NEs, 
while filled bars and circles are stable NEs. Parametric values are the 
same as in Figure 3.  
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has a bigger basin of attraction. An interesting finding of 
this analysis is that, as all the discriminators punish, all 
discriminators cooperate with each other to avoid punish-
ment at the equilibrium (1, 1). As a result (1, 1) has stable 
cooperation in the system, but ironically no individuals 
are primarily cooperators.  
Discussion  
Punishment in PD is unstable in the presence of non-
punishing cooperators. In models where only cooperators 
are allowed to punish as well as models where even defec-
tors can punish, both punishers and cooperators are stable 
above a threshold value of punishers (Figures 1 and 8 b). 
However, this stability is weak since at this stage selec-
tion is neutral for both punishers and cooperators and 
natural drift can drive the punishment below this thresh-
old level. Similar arguments have been raised for co-
operation based on direct32 and indirect5 reciprocity. The 
only possible solution to this problem will be a selective 
advantage to punishers over cooperators and defectors. 
We recognize that discriminating individuals can give 
such selective advantage to the punishers. These discrimi-
nating defectors can spontaneously emerge in a popula-
tion of cooperators, punishers and defectors, if the cost of 
discrimination is low and the cost of cooperation as well 
as the penalty paid by punished defector is sufficiently 
large.  
 Our discriminating defectors are quite different from 
other discriminators considered in the evolutionary game 
theory earlier. In the earlier models of indirect reciprocity 
or reputation, cooperators discriminate and selectively 
cooperate with a reputed cooperator33. This is paradoxical 
because first, in terms of rational game theory, why 
should players care about the reputation of others beyond 
their own payoff, and secondly, why should they decrease 
their own reputation by withholding help from those who 
are less reputed? Also, cooperating with a cooperator is 
not a rational choice (or a NE) in a PD interaction. Our 
discriminator, on the contrary, is self-concerned and 
while he defects with other strategies, he only cooperates 
with the punishers to avoid getting punished.  
 A major essence of our model is that all the strategies 
have purely selfish motivations and yet the population 
evolves cooperation through stability of punishment. In 
our game, discriminating defectors make the act of punish-
ment non-altruistic. Punishers punish a defector at a cost 
to themselves, but in return gain reputation and coopera-
tion from discriminating defectors who are threatened by 
the punishment. This is in contrast to altruistic punish-
ment discussed by other workers6,12,24.  
 Public knowledge of the strategies is a key factor of 
our model. A discriminating defector can gather informa-
tion in a variety of ways, including eavesdropping, gos-
siping or a network of communication, but irrespective of 
the way we have assumed that discrimination is costly. A 
number of models so far that have incorporated discrimi-
nating strategies4,5,21,33 have neglected such a cost. In the 
present model the mode of gathering information is not 
trivial. Rather, the limitations of such information and 
mistakes in discrimination are of more concern, especially 
in the cases of gossiping and a network of communica-
tion, where the trustworthiness of the orator is in question. 
We have shown that the model is fairly robust against 
limitations and mistakes in discrimination (Figures 4  
and 7). 
 If DD players cooperate with players other than PC 
players by mistake, up to a critical error rate, the dynamics 
of our game is not qualitatively affected. If they cooper-
ate too often, PC players cannot invade the population of 
DD players, and since the population of DD players is 
always vulnerable to invasion by unconditional defectors, 
cooperation is fleeting under this condition. It is ironical 
that cooperating too often leads to the collapse of co- 
operation. This scenario further bolsters our argument 
that refinement in defection and discrimination is essen-
tial for the evolution of cooperation. Our results further 
suggest that indirect reciprocity4,5 alone is an unlikely 
candidate for the evolution of cooperation.  
 At a second level we have relaxed the assumptions that 
players can use only discrete strategies and that only  
cooperators can punish. Even when these conditions are 
relaxed, we show that discriminating defectors help in the 
evolution of punishment behaviour (Figure 8 b and c). 
Recent studies advocated the maintenance of stable co-
operation in the population in the presence of selfish  
punishers who defect in the main game, but punish those 
who have defected26–28. However, just giving the defector 
a chance of punishment did not stabilize punishment in 
our game dynamics (Figure 8 a). We observed that  
punishment was only weakly stable and defection without 
punishment was the only stable NE of the game. None-
theless, addition of discriminating defectors stabilized 
punishment in all the scenarios. Furthermore, in a sub-
game where we considered the presence of only defec-
tors, discriminating defectors and punishers were present, 
and discriminating defectors who punished were stable 
with a bigger basin of attraction (Figure 8 c). This situa-
tion is the most interesting because there are no coopera-
tors in the system. However, since discriminating 
defectors cooperate with the punishers and since all the 
discriminating defectors are punishers at this equilibrium, 
stable cooperation is maintained in the system without 
classical ‘cooperators’. 
Conclusion 
The human social system, which is based on cooperation 
in genetically unrelated individuals and often in a large 
population, is better explained by strong reciprocity in 
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terms of punishment to a defector as a more promising 
mechanism than kin selection and direct reciprocity. 
However, how costly punishment becomes stable is an 
enduring evolutionary conundrum. Contemporary work 
that explains the stability of altruistic punishment requires 
special conditions. Our argument based on discriminating 
and punishing defectors is a simple, yet practical mecha-
nism that has the potential to explain the stability of  
punishment and cooperation in human social systems. 
The essence of our system is that all the strategies have a 
selfish foundation and yet it evolves cooperation for a 
wide set of conditions. In our extended PD game punish-
ment is not altruistic, since in the presence of discriminat-
ing defectors, punishers have a high probability of getting  
cooperation. Another attractive feature of our findings is 
that the punishment (and in turn cooperation) is highly 
robust against mistakes in discrimination. Thus, in human 
interactions where public knowledge of strategies emplo-
yed by other players is possible, even at a small cost to 
self, discriminating defectors can stabilize punishment in 
a wide set of conditions. 
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